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Remedies is about the intersection of things. 1
I. INTRODUCTION

Remedies do not fit neatly into law’s boxes. Remedies as a legal
subject matter is complex. It cuts across categories—the topic is transsubstantive by nature. Further, within the field, specific remedies often
defy categorization. For example, certain remedies, such as restitutionary
disgorgement, may straddle the law-equity divide. To complicate the
inquiry of this article more, Remedies lies at the intersection of procedure
and substance. Remedies connects substantive fields and delivers any
ultimate entitlements—or their monetary substitute—to the winning
claimant.
It is no wonder that remedies in individual cases pose significant
challenges to any simple application of the Erie analysis. 2 Remedies are
neither procedure nor substance except when they are. 3 Remedies aid
substance and require procedure to deliver on plaintiff’s substantive
1. Caprice L. Roberts, Teaching Remedies from Theory to Practice, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713,
713 (2013).
2. See Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 219 (2018)
(“[M]any remedies issues fit awkwardly at best within the Erie framework.”).
3. A related point is that the size of the right is a part of the right. Tunks, Categorization and
Federalism: “Substance” and “Procedure” After Erie Railroad v. Tomkins, 34 ILL. L. REV. 271
(1939); WALTER WHEELER COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 163–65
(1942). For helpful considerations of the substance-procedure divide, explore the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts. Consider also the choice-of-law treatment of remedies as procedural, but this
frame does not inherently govern in the Erie context. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CHOICE OF LAW
69, 72 (2016) (explaining that remedies are classified as procedural rather than substantive for choiceof-law purposes, but also noting that analysis is “not necessarily” the same when determining “the
line separating procedure for ‘Erie purposes’”). See also RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
THE CONFLICTS OF LAW 59–62 (5th ed. 2006) (explaining that the determination of whether a rule is
substantive or procedural in the conflict-of-law context requires balancing the forum’s difficulty in
applying the foreign rule against the probability of affecting the case’s outcome and encouraging
forum shopping). Accordingly, proceed with caution: “Matters of ‘substance’ and matters of
‘procedure’ are much talked about in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across
the whole domain of law. But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same key-words to very
different problems. . . . Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for
which it is used.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
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entitlements. But where exactly do remedies fit? In searching a law library
for Dobbs’ original Remedies treatise, the entire treatment may well be
housed under “Procedure.” 4 Why? A relic of the development of the
subject of Remedies as a course? 5 Or due to its precursor course, Equity? 6
Or based on the roots of equitable jurisdiction versus a court of law? Or a
result of intentional or accidental line-drawing by courts after Erie?
But what is in a label anyway? 7 Even the Supreme Court quickly
recognized the shortcomings of assuming labels lead to definitive
classifications. 8 For that reason, the Court has suggested focusing on
Erie’s driving purpose—uniformity—and developed the outcomedeterminative test. 9 Yet, that test is not the end of the story, at least when
it comes to equitable remedies.
It is a mistake to assume that Remedies as a field does not contain its
own doctrines and goals. It does. But the principles of Remedies may
conflict or parallel the underlying substantive law of the cause of action.10
If conflict arises, federal court treatment of remedies doctrines under Erie
has heightened import.
II. REMEDIES AND OUTCOMES
After all, the remedy that a court grants is the “outcome” of the
case. 11
The Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins proclaimed that a
federal court exercising jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship must
follow state law. 12 This edict of Erie applies with equal force to
4. It would be interesting to conduct a library survey for classification of the Remedies
treatise. I found Dobbs’s initial edition under “Procedure” at the Lawton Chiles Information Center
at the University of Florida’s Levin College of Law.
5. See generally Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG.
161 (2008) (examining the development of the modern American law of remedies).
6. Id.
7. The law-equity determination cannot be based on choice of labels. See, e.g., Dairy Queen
v. Wood, 36 U.S. 469, 476–79 (1962) (refusing to permit plaintiff’s selection of an accounting remedy
and characterization as purely equitable govern the constitutional right to a jury trial).
8. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
9. Id.; see also John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 173 (1999)
(“Recognizing that the terms substance and procedure are mere labels, the York Court analyzed the
question in light of the purpose of Erie, which was to ensure uniformity in result between federal and
state courts.”).
10. Roberts, supra note 1, at 713.
11. Cross, supra note 9, at 174. This quote is more controversial for remedies that precede a
trial on the merits such as preliminary injunctions. Still, a federal court’s grant of preliminary relief
may well be the first and last word of the case. OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS
(2d ed. 2001).
12. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. 13 Erie’s primary holding
represented a complete break from the reasoning of Swift v. Tyson 14 that
had countenanced the development of “federal general common law.” 15
The guiding force behind Erie and its preservation to date remains the
interest in uniformity. 16
The Court further interpreted Erie in Hanna v. Plumer to direct
federal courts to resolve choice-of-law issues by applying federal law to
procedural issues and state law to substantive issues. 17 The unanimous
decision emphasized federal judicial authority under The Rules Enabling
Act to control its own practice and pleading procedures. 18 According to
the Court, the federal service-of-process rule at issue fell within the
Enabling Act power. 19 This procedural power is explicitly limited,
however, by the constitutional right to a jury trial: “Such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the
right of trial by jury.” 20 The Court reasoned that the procedural rule did
not violate any constitutional requirements. 21 Due to conformity with the
Enabling Act and the Constitution, the Court determined that the federal
service rule was the proper standard to apply in a case sitting in diversity
jurisdiction, 22 notwithstanding that such a procedural difference would be
outcome-determinative. 23
Despite Erie’s underlying value, 24 the Hanna Court concluded: “To
hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function
13. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (ruling that Erie applies to the same extent as
diversity when federal courts exercise pendent jurisdiction over state-based claims).
14. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
15. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
16. Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 HARV. L. REV.
966, 974 (1946) (reasoning that states courts hearing cases involving federal law must carry out Erie’s
“main theme” of uniformity by applying federal law if a federal court would have applied federal
principles to resolve the issue).
17. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464–65 (1965).
18. Id. at 464 (citing The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)).
19. Id. at 463–64.
20. Id. at 464 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 468–69.
24. Yet, outcome-determinativeness is not Erie’s sole value: “The ‘outcome-determination’
test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of justice.” Id. at 468. Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion in Hanna laments the oversimplification of all of these tests for proving too much;
instead
the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or a federal rule,
whether “substantive” or “procedural,” is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if
the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human
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whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to
disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal
procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling
Act.” 25 Hanna provides a proper pedigree route to the choice between a
federal and state prescription. For example, pursuant to Hanna’s rationale,
a valid federal rule, such as Federal Rule 65 for injunction procedure,
governs in federal cases under diversity jurisdiction. Still, finding the
proper balance between federal and state law and the exact line between
substance and procedure is often debatable. 26
What of equity? Twenty years before Hanna, the Court revisited
Erie’s command in the context of equity. 27 In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
the plaintiff sought an equitable accounting remedy and claimed the right
to sue under a New York statute that provided beneficiaries the power to
sue their trustees. 28 Defendant argued the arrangement was not a trust, and
that the federal court sitting in diversity should dismiss the suit based on
the state’s statute of limitation. 29 The Second Circuit ruled that laches was
a matter of remedy rather than right such that federal law must apply. 30
The Supreme Court reversed and applied state law to block the matter.31
Yet in its reasoning, the Supreme Court refined Erie’s reach and
clarified federal equity power. It reasoned that traditional, federal
principles of equity must continue despite Erie’s disdain for federal
common law. 32 Equity was unique and special, and its power traced back
to the English Court of Chancery. 33 In fact, the Court explained that a
federal court sitting in diversity as an alternative forum to the state court

conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulations. If so, Erie and the
Constitution require the state rule prevail, even in the face of a conflicting federal rule.
Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 473–74.
26. In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), the Court examined the
federal district court’s posture sitting in diversity but also confronting the federal constitutional right
to jury trial. Pursuant to Erie, the lower court looked to New York state law for how to assess
excessiveness of damages; specifically, it applied a New York statute mandating the judge review the
verdict for “material deviation” from reasonable compensation. Id. at 425. The Supreme Court
reasoned that the state law at issue “contains a procedural instruction, but the State’s objective is
manifestly substantive.” Id. at 429.
27. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.
28. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 511 (2d Cir. 1944).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 522–23.
31. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 112.
32. Id. at 104.
33. Id.; see also Morley, supra note 2, at 218 (discussing and critiquing the “so-called equitable
remedial rights doctrine” as unfounded and otherwise problematic).
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may “afford an equitable remedy not available in a State court” 34 as long
as within the federal court’s traditional equity power 35 and not otherwise
constitutionally or congressionally restricted. 36 Ultimately, the Court
reasoned that despite caselaw characterizing such rules as remedial and
procedural, 37 the state statute’s complete barrier to recovery aligned more
with a right than a remedy: it would “so intimately affect recovery or
nonrecovery” such that the federal court in diversity jurisdiction must
follow the state bar. 38 Still, York’s broader rationale carving out space for
federal courts to render equity interpretations when sitting in diversity
remains. “Dicta” will continue to “be cited characterizing equity as an
independent body of law.” 39 Though brooding omnipresent equity is now
“replaced by a shaper analysis of what federal courts do when they enforce
rights that have no federal origin,” 40 independent federal equity continues.
John Cross explored and confirmed the justifications for the equity
exception to Erie. 41 He acknowledged that equity is an accident of
history. 42 Ultimately, however, he demonstrated sufficient reasons for
equity to be treated differently than Erie convention dictates. 43 Though
the outcome may be different, Cross concluded that federal courts must
garner significant discretion in the interpretation and application of
equitable procedure, remedies, and defenses.44 This logic remains enticing
despite risks of undermining Erie and underappreciating state
prerogatives.
Doug Rendleman provides a useful reexamination 45 of the powerful
charge that equity had gone too far in swallowing the common law as
advanced in Steve Subrin’s seminal work, How Equity Conquered the

34. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 105.
35. Id. (noting the restrictions on equity relief in federal court including “the suit must be within
the traditional scope of equity as historically evolved in the English Court of Chancery” and “a plain,
adequate and complete remedy at law must be wanting.”).
36. Id. (detailing other restraints including that Congress may restrict equity powers and that
any exercise of federal equity power may not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial).
37. Id. at 109 (“It is therefore immaterial whether statutes of limitation are characterized either
as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ in State court opinions in any use of those terms unrelated to the
specific issue before us.”).
38. Id. at 110.
39. Id. at 112 (“To the extent that we have indicated, it is.”).
40. Id. (distinguishing modern federal equity after Erie from older sweeping notions).
41. Cross, supra note 9.
42. Id. at 232.
43. Id. at 231–32.
44. Id. at 174.
45. Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discretion,
15 NEV. L.J. 1397 (2015).
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Common Law. 46 Subrin decried the expansion of equity at the expense of
the common law. 47 For example, he criticized the breadth of equity’s
conquest over the common law by creating new rights in more relaxed,
dynamic ways. 48 Subrin, however, did not call for the eradication of
equity, but rather, for revitalization of the common law and its
adjudicative tools. 49 In revisiting Subrin’s work, Rendleman thoughtfully
explores the nature of equity and the “stages of equitable discretion.” 50
Rendleman details the pathway of a hypothetical nuisance case in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction. 51 He examines earlier charges
regarding the problems of “on-the-spot” decisionmaking and amorphous,
unmoored discretion of equity determinations. 52 But, discretion abounds
in procedure, equity, and beyond. 53 Rendleman ultimately seeks
balancing; he warns that courts should not exceed their power with
“unprincipled discretion” hidden behind the cloak of equity’s “ancient
language.” 54
The modern dilemma, in my opinion, is how to retain the historical
power and flexibility of equity while maintaining limits to ensure the use
of reasoned discretion. Only then 55 will we make the most of the federal
courts increasing remedies-diversity docket.

46. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
47. Id. at 1001 (“The total victory of equity process has caused us to forget the essence of civil
adjudication: enabling citizens to have their legitimate expectancies and rights fulfilled.”).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1001–02.
50. Doug Rendleman, supra note 48, at 1410–50.
51. Id. at 1400, 1409.
52. Id. at 1410–50.
53. Id. at 1405.
54. Id. at 1450.
55. A counterargument is to simply view all of equity and law as one system and move forward,
especially if one thinks the specialness of equity is greatly exaggerated and over mythologized. See
generally Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (Summer 1993).
Still, the Supreme Court has maintained the distinction between law and equity. Rendleman, supra
note 48, at 1404. Equity maintains its magnetic pull.
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III. FEDERAL EQUITY POWER 56
Federal equity power arises from Article III 57 and the Judiciary Act
of 1789. 58 According to Laura Fitzgerald, the Act “authorized the federal
judiciary to develop for itself a uniquely federal law of equity.” 59 Within
this power, 60 federal courts maintain the ability to discern equitable
procedures, remedies, and defenses. 61 The power is delicate and must not
be abused. Federal courts should be careful to articulate its bases of power
and their boundaries. 62
Even a strong view of federal equity power, however, does not mean
that such power should lack restraint. Federal jurists themselves must
exercise restraint. Justice Stone advanced this stance and relied on
principles, precedent, institutional bounds, and federalism as compelling
limits. 63 Equity has always been perceived as, and remains, “a potentially
dangerous but nonetheless essential judicial power.” 64 Federal courts must
exercise this power of equity carefully, as unbridled discretion diminishes
respect for the rule of law generally.
IV. THE STAYING POWER OF EQUITY
The law-equity divide remains vital for Seventh Amendment, for
defenses, and more. Some scholars lament the persistence of equity and
call for further fusion. 65 Two primary counterarguments exist on
56. For an in-depth examination of the history of the federal court equity power, see Kristin A.
Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the
Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249 (2010). See also Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable
Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530 (2016).
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
58. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
59. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1263 (2001).
60. For a thoughtful exploration of the complex and evolutionary history of judge-made law
and the federal court equity power as a “story of change,” see generally Collins, supra note 59.
61. Cf. Morley, supra note 2, at 220 (maintaining the assertion of federal equity power
“exceeds . . . the scope of federal courts’ Article III judicial power,” as well as “federalism-based
limits on the federal government’s power as a whole”).
62. Controversy surrounds claims of inherent federal court powers. See, e.g., Amy Coney
Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006) (suggesting
the Supreme Court’s power to prescribe procedural rules for lower federal courts lies more in
constitutional supremacy than Article III’s grant of inherent authority).
63. Gary L. McDowell, A Scrupulous Regard for the Rightful Independence of the States:
Justice Stone and the Limits of the Federal Equity Power, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 507, 511, 515,
519 (1984).
64. Id. at 507.
65. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 53
(1993); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange,
27 REV. LITIG. 63 (2007).
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descriptive and normative grounds. The first is that complete fusion is
unattainable because of the constitutional lines of demarcation. The
United States Constitution 66 and state constitutions 67 explicitly
distinguish law from equity for the purposes of providing constitutional
rights to jury trials in certain civil cases. History also supports rationales
for distinct treatment. 68 The second counterargument is that equitable
remedies, doctrines, and defenses comprise a distinct, historical system
and that it is one worth maintaining. 69
Is federal equity power as exercised pursuant to Guaranty Trust a
problem? Michael Morley, examining equitable injunctions under Erie,
concluded that federal equity power to develop uniform doctrines is
unauthorized. 70 He laments the extent to which Guaranty Trust thwarts
Erie’s purpose of ending the development of general common law by
federal courts: “Despite Erie’s purported abolition of general law and
relegation of federal common law to a few distinct areas in which federal
interests predominate, equity lingers as a vestigial ‘brooding
omnipresence’ that may dictate the results of diversity and supplemental
jurisdiction cases.” 71 Morley ultimately recommends finishing what Erie
started with respect to dismantling general law by eliminating “the
lingering remnants of the old federal equity power.” 72 His suggestion
would give substantial power to states to develop the doctrines of
procedure and remedies doctrines in addition to the existing authority to
dictate substantive law. Benefits include finishing the merger effort and
eliminating anachronistic, confusing categories. Many of Morley’s
critiques have traction, but his conclusion is less persuasive. He asserts
that federal courts deem all remedies “categorically substantive” 73 despite
any arguments of the mixed procedural and substantive nature of
remedies. 74

66. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
67. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
68. Cf. Morley, supra note 2.
69. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, supra note 59.
70. Morley, supra note 2, at 220, 278 (maintaining that nothing in federal law, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or the Constitution “authorizes federal courts to craft and apply a uniform
body of equitable principles, including equitable remedial principles, to all claims that come before
them, regardless of the source of law from which a claim arises.”).
71. Morley, supra note 2, at 249.
72. Id. at 279.
73. Id. at 263.
74. Id. (“Some scholars contend that remedies exist in the hazy hinterlands between the much
more familiar realms of ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ rights. Whatever the merits of such arguments,
remedies should be deemed substantive under the Erie Doctrine.”).
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As a Federal Courts professor as well as Remedies, I am protective
of federal court power and domain, though cognizant of limits by
constitutional design as well as the import of judicial restraint. My
protective stance makes me wary of Morley’s overall project, though one
cannot ignore certain valid critiques he raises such as the anachronistic
and confusing nature of the law-equity divide. On whole, however, I
conclude that federal courts have the constitutional, historical, and
precedential power to develop federal equity doctrines and remedies.
Federal courts, however, can and should vigilantly respect state’s domain
with respect to substantive doctrines as best it can. The reason for courts
to hedge the best they can is to acknowledge that the line between
procedure and substance and law and equity are not always clear.
In a follow-up piece, 75 Morley reinforces his prior position. He
examines the conflicting treatment between federal and state courts on
what he deems similar elements.76 He argues that courts must look beyond
the listed elements to the underlying body of precedent. 77 He maintains
that state law should control equitable remedies, as they do state
substantive causes of action. 78 According to Morley, this result should
occur without a litigant proving the issue is outcome determinative. 79
Rather, federal courts should reach the Erie analysis. 80 Morley calls for
overturning the Supreme Court’s precedent on the Erie exception for the
development of federal equity: “Guaranty Trust’s equitable remedial
rights doctrine should be discarded.” 81
Federal courts are capable and tasked with drawing those lines. Take
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 82 It directs federal courts
on the procedure to be followed when analyzing a motion for an
injunction. Generally, federal rules govern procedure, while state law
governs substance. 83 This distinction persists despite friction with

75. Michael T. Morley, Beyond the Elements: Erie and the Standards for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunctions, 52 AKRON L. REV. 455 (2019).
76. Id. at 478-88.
77. Id. at 488-490 (analogizing to “pierc[ing] the veil” to discern the body of precedent the
elements represent).
78. Id. at 468.
79. See id. at 489 (“A court should not require litigants to affirmatively demonstrate that
competing bodies of equitable remedial principles may lead to different results before engaging in an
Erie analysis.”).
80. Id. at 479, 489.
81. Id. at 471.
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
83. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464–65 (1965) (defining procedure as “the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
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methods of enforcing state-created rights. 84 And even though the
procedures of the federal system and state vary. 85 Federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, have developed caselaw interpreting the
broader doctrines to be met when seeking such an equitable remedy in
federal court. Shouldn’t state law be relevant to that determination if the
federal court’s jurisdiction hinges on diversity? But it is relevant through
application of the federal factors, and this respect for state substantive law
strikes a proper balance. The federal court would look to Rule 65 and
federal precedent such as eBay, but when considering one of the federal
injunction factors—the likelihood of success on the merits—the federal
court properly examines state law on the potential merits of the underlying
state cause of action.
To the extent we determine that controversial uses of remedies need
adjustment, federal rules must be able to reach and shape the behavior.
Imagine we change Federal Rule 65 to combat the perceived rise and
perhaps abuse of the so-called nationwide 86 injunction, as Sam Bray has
proposed. 87 It is imperative that any federal court, whether the case arises
under federal law or falls under diversity jurisdiction, would need to
follow any new constraints. If instead the federal court completely
deferred to state law on such standards as injunctions, then Congress’s
power to remedy federal court overreaching via remedies in federal cases
would be undermined if not eliminated. Yet, Article III plainly intends
extensive federal congressional authority over federal court power.
V. FEDERAL COURTS SITTING IN DIVERSITY HANDLING REMEDIES
The existing balance of powers is not broken. Maintaining the
existing system is worth it even if some inconsistencies, some
overreaching, and some gray areas persist. Such flaws suggest reforms
should be moderate rather than radical. Of course, checks on power
remain wise, but sufficient checks already exist. Litigants and their
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them” and noting that congressionally proscribed
rules must conform to the power granted by the Rules Enabling Act).
84. See id. at 473 (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function
whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the
Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in
the Enabling Act.”).
85. Id.
86. The nationwide label is a misnomer. See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, “Nationwide”
Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate: On the Scope of
Injunctions in Constitutional Litigation, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335 (2018).
87. Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 417 (2017).
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lawyers help ensure proper consideration of relevant state doctrines.
Federal appellate courts provide opportunities to review the appropriate
balance between federal and state law. Another formidable way to alter
the balance are the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any necessary
amendments.
Federal courts sitting in diversity generally do and should apply
federal equitable remedies standards. For example, take a request for a
preliminary injunction in federal court considering a state law claim under
diversity jurisdiction. The federal standards for preliminary injunctions
should apply. 88 Of course, there are federal courts sitting in diversity that
have not looked to federal standards when determining equitable
remedies. 89
Consider a few examples showing how federal courts sitting in
diversity or evaluating supplemental state-based claims regularly and
effectively balance federal procedure with state substantive law. The cases
may reflect imperfection in citation choices, but overall, federal courts
generally achieve a healthy balance of honoring Erie, developing federal
equity under Guaranty Trust, and respecting state prerogatives when
approaching substance.
For example, a federal district court evaluating a request for a
preliminary injunction, sought to balance Florida state law on contracts
with federal standards for injunctive relief. 90 Regarding the preliminary
88. See David E. Shipley, The Preliminary Injunction Standard in Diversity: A Typical
Unguided Erie Choice, 50 GA. L. REV. 1169 (2016); see also Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation
After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522
(2011); DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES—CASES & MATERIALS 125
Comment 4 (9th ed. 2018).
89. See, e.g., Charles Simkin & Sons v. Massiah, 289 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1961) (plaintiff sought
injunctive relief, essentially “equitable replevin,” to get equipment returned, yet judge cited only New
Jersey state-court opinions on the remedy standards); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note
88, at 1181–83. On the concept of injunctive relief as equitable replevin, see Von Hecke, Equitable
Replevin, 33 N.C. L. REV. 57 (1954).
90. Fla. Panthers Hockey Club, Ltd. v. Miami Sports & Exhibition Auth., 939 F. Supp. 855
(S.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Florida Panthers v. City of Miami, 116 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1997).
The Florida Panthers case also included federal antitrust counts, though one of defendant moved to
dismiss that count on immunity grounds and another defendant planned to file a motion to dismiss.
Id. at 856 n.1. Based on the antitrust claims, Plaintiff asserted federal question as the basis for
jurisdiction with supplemental jurisdiction over the state law breach of contract claim. Given the
motion to dismiss, the federal court held the antitrust counts in abeyance and thus considered only the
state law breach of contract claim when it considered Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.
Id. Though “where the jurisdiction of the federal court depends on a federal statute, the evils which
the Erie doctrine was designed to prevent are not present, and so the same need does not exist for
requiring the federal court to follow state law.” Exceptions to Erie, supra note 17, at 970. Still, the
principles of Erie loom over the supplemental state law claim. Regardless, the federal court’s
injunctive relief discussion remains useful to see how the federal court honors state doctrines versus
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injunction standard, the federal district court cited federal circuit and
district court cases. 91 This method stayed intact for both the burden and
the elements of the injunctive relief sought. But as the court drifted toward
the potential strength of the underlying claim, 92 it cited Florida state court
cases. 93 For the proposition raised by defendant that specific performance
will not lie for personal service contracts, the federal court cited both a
federal and a state case. 94 Perhaps the court simply cited both by virtue of
defendant’s pleading and to note that both federal and state law support
defendant’s assertion. The court reasoned, however, that the blackletter
barrier was not applicable to the type of contract at issue. It determined
that the equitable remedy of specific performance should be available
where the underlying sports contract amounted to “a lease agreement”
because “such an agreement may be subject to specific performance.”95
The court cited no case law for this determination, but opted to close the
analysis on this point with a recognition of state law boundaries for the
availability of specific performance for certain types of contractual
obligations. The remainder of the court’s analysis on the likelihood of

federal law where the cause of action at issue is a state-based contract claim seeking equitable
remedies (preliminary injunction that would achieve specific performance of the contract). See also
DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION
643 n.112 (citing Arias v. Solis, 754 F. Supp. 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Lewis v. Rahman, 147 F. Supp.
2d 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). In Arias v. Solis, the federal court, sitting diversity jurisdiction, approved
court power to enforce negative covenant upon finding of uniqueness. Arias, 754 F. Supp. at 290. It
cited to both state and federal cases. Id. at 293–95. The court relied solely on federal rules and federal
cases to rule that plaintiff satisfied the proper amount-in-controversy for diversity jurisdiction; it did
so without assessing comparative merits of substantive claims. Id. at 292–93. It relied on federal rules
and federal cases for consideration of the requisite security bond for the injunction and determined
the federal court maintained discretion in setting the amount. Id. at 295–96. Similarly, in Lewis v.
Rahman, the federal court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, equitably enforced negative employment
covenant causing the boxer to put his career on hold for eighteen months. Lewis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at
225. The court cited to New York caselaw on contract liability, id. at 233–35, but it analyzed federal
precedent on injunctive power and relief. Id. at 237–38. Interestingly, the court entertained
defendant’s citation to a New York case on lack of mutuality but concluded the doctrine was
inapplicable. Id. at 237. Note that the citation of federal cases does not necessarily translate into
reliance on federal principles. Often the citations are to federal cases that also sat in diversity
jurisdiction and themselves included citation to state and federal precedents. This blended approach
shows comity while also permitting federal courts to enunciate and interpret the boundaries of its
equity power while cognizant of state maxims.
91. Fla. Panthers, 939 F. Supp. at 858–59 (citing cases from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida).
92. The specific analysis falls under Part III.A of the court’s opinion entitled, “Substantial
Likelihood of Success on the Merits.” Id. at 858.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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success on the merits focused on the contract language at issue without
citation to any caselaw. 96 For the other injunction factors, the court cites
to federal case law.
Overall, the Florida Panthers court balanced its consideration of
federal caselaw on equity standards with a nod to state law on contract
law. It may be that the court did more than it needed to, given that the
point for which it cited state law was also an equitable remedies doctrine
related to specific performance. There is no Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure on the point. Federal cases exist, and the court cited those as
well as a state case. 97 This blend shows comity for the state’s doctrines
that touch on how the substance of contract law ties to equitable requests
for relief like specific performance where the whole point is to order the
defendant to do exactly what the contract promises.
Perhaps the Florida Panthers court would have been wise to cite
only federal precedent on the basis that federal law governs not just
federal procedure but also requests for equitable remedies per the Erie
exception created by Guaranty Trust. Simply because federal courts have
the power to develop federal equity does not mean that federal courts must
toil in the interpretive field alone. Further, if the equitable remedy is closer
to the ground—meaning closer to the underlying body of substantive state
law—federal courts are wise to not ignore a robust body of law already
developed by the state
This dynamic is likely true for the specific performance remedy for
state law breach of contract claims. Federal doctrines of equity generally
align with state doctrines of equity regarding the availability of specific
performance. Alignment makes the absence of citation less problematic.
Even in well developed areas of doctrine, however, variations can
develop. For example, a federal court very familiar with the eBay line of
cases might interpret the Court’s reasoning to show general disdain for
any presumed factors in the quest for any equitable remedies; meanwhile
a state court might continue to presume uniqueness and irreparability for
certain contracts like real estate.
How do federal judges handle choice of law regarding consideration
of legal remedies in cases in federal court under diversity jurisdiction?
Are the principles of Erie and its progeny frustrated when federal courts
technically follow Erie by ultimately acknowledging the state’s
substantive law but provide an opinion filled with dicta on how the sitting
federal judge would treat the remedy? In other words, what if the judge

96.
97.

Id. at 858–59.
Id. at 858.
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uses the federal moment to signal and shift jurisprudence of the
underlying state? A detour with now retired Judge Posner will show artful
attempts in dicta to influence the state’s substantive law. Are such signals
permissible under Erie? Beyond the federal court’s Article III power? If
within the federal court’s power, are such federal pockets of reasoning
wise? At minimum these opinions raise federalism concerns.
Take Mindgames, Inc. v. Western Publishing Co. 98 Plaintiff
Mindgames alleged that Defendant Western Publishing Company
breached the contract for failing to promote Plaintiff’s board game, Clever
Endeavor. 99 Plaintiff sought expectancy damages in the form of
anticipated royalties that would have flowed had Defendant not breached
the contract. 100 The Mindgames contract included a choice of law clause
in favor of Arkansas. 101 Sitting in diversity, the federal district court relied
upon a 1924 Arkansas case 102 to rule that the new business rule barred
plaintiff from recovering any lost profits thus dictating summary
judgment for defendant. 103 Judge Posner, considering the appeal on behalf
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sidesteps
Arkansas law and instead inserts his own views in order to propel the
jurisprudence toward a standard rather than an outmoded rule that bars
recovery to new businesses. 104
Judge Posner reasons that the Arkansas Supreme Court, if presented
with the opportunity to review its 1924 precedent, would reconsider the
prohibition and instead adopt a more lenient standard. 105 According to
Judge Posner, “[t]hat is the best prediction in this case.” 106 Judge Posner
rejects the state of Arkansas’s bright-line prohibition to recovery for all
new businesses. 107 Instead, he endorses a more fluid standard that permits
the recovery of lost profits for a new venture as long as the evidence is not
unduly speculative. 108 Under the standard, he then determines that
plaintiff failed to establish the reasonable degree of certainty required.109
98. Mindgames, Inc. v. Western Publishing Co., 218 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2000); see also
RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 820–27; Victor P. Goldberg, The New Business Rule and
Compensation for Lost Profits, 1 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 341 (2016).
99. Mindgames, 218 F.3d at 653.
100. Id. at 654.
101. Id. at 653.
102. Marvell Light & Ice Co. v. General Elec. Co., 259 S.W. 741 (Ark. 1924).
103. Mindgames, 218 F.3d at 655.
104. Id. at 656.
105. Id. at 658 (“Abrogation of the ‘new business’ rule does not produce a free-for-all.”).
106. Id. at 656.
107. Id. at 658.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 659.
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Plaintiff’s lack of a track record establishes the speculative nature of
proving lost royalties. 110 Also, Judge Posner views Plaintiff as the least
cost avoider in that it made no efforts to distribute the game by other
means, which Judge Posner sees as “telling evidence of a lack of
commercial promise unrelated to Western’s conduct.” 111 Ultimately,
Plaintiff loses despite the more favorable standard that Judge Posner
adopts. 112
Judge Posner not only predicts what the Arkansas high court would
do if it reexamined its precedent on the new business rule, but then also
rules as a matter of law that Plaintiff fails to meet the freshly adopted
standard of reasonable certainty. The dissenting judge called for a remand
of the issue because the appellate court “cannot say on this record, as a
matter of law, that Mindgames cannot prove to a reasonable certainty that
Western’s failures to perform, if proved, caused a loss of sales.” 113
Compare the judicial restraint showed by the federal district court
judge in Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co. 114 Plaintiffs filed a
class action seeking medical monitoring for fear of developing cancer
after exposure to toxins but before succumbing to any disease or physical
injury from the exposure. 115 Judge Goodwin expresses explicit disdain for
the relaxed substantive standards in West Virginia law regarding the
remedy sought. 116 He rules that Plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim
survives because West Virginia law has recognized a cause of action to
recover such costs if proven “necessary and reasonably certain to be
incurred as a proximate result of the defendant’s tortious conduct.” 117 But
Judge Goodwin shows reasonable methods for registering skepticism
110. Id. at 658.
111. Id. at 659.
112. Goldberg, supra note 98, at 361 (“MindGames is a classic case of a plaintiff winning the
battle but losing the war.”). To add insult to injury, plaintiff’s failure to seek nominal damages
squandered its chance to receive an attorney fee award under Arkansas’s prevailing party in a breach
of contract action. Id. (citing MindGames, 218 F.3d at 654).
113. Mindgames, 218 F.3d at 660 (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
114. Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 751 (S.D. W. Va. 2009).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 775. Judge Goodwin traces the Supreme Court’s developing jurisprudence on
fear of cancer claims. He then cites and explains precedent contrary to West Virginia’s despite a
similar claim. He explains that the Michigan high court denied a relief for medical monitoring where
plaintiffs alleged injuries were ‘‘wholly derivative of a possible, future injury rather than an actual,
present injury.’’ Id. (quoting Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 691 (2005)). Judge Goodwin
appreciates the policy concern the Michigan court expressed regarding the alternative universe in
which a limitless pool of plaintiffs arises. Id. He also cites scholarly works that support the Michigan
approach and criticize West Virginia’s stance. Id.
117. Id. at 773–74 (quoting Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va.
1999) (cleaned up)).
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while following Erie by applying a state substantive rule that he deems
dubious. He emphasizes the judicial binding within which he finds
himself sitting in diversity jurisdiction: “I am bound to apply West
Virginia substantive law in this diversity case.” 118
In contrast, Judge Posner in Mindgames shows far less deference in
content and tone. Judge Posner is more brazen in his approach: he again
offers pages and pages of his federal circuit reasoning but in the final
disposition notes the Erie constraint and offers that state law—albeit on
different grounds—leads to the result he reaches. Could Judge Posner’s
opinion in Mindgames be an aberration?
Consider Judge Posner again in two negligence cases involving
attempts to recover purely economic losses: Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank
Corp. 119 and Rardin v. T & D Machine Handling, Inc. 120 Most
jurisdictions handle such a problem in one of two ways: either bar the
claim under the common law economic loss rule 121 or allow plaintiff to
proceed to the jury if plaintiff can show defendant owed a special duty
rendering plaintiff’s lost profits within the proximately caused harms 122
pursuant to Palsgraf. 123 Judge Posner finds these traditional paths
intellectually unsatisfying, so he offers a contractual path to resolve these
non-contracts cases. Despite the lack of privity and lack of a breach of
contract claim, Judge Posner uses the federal platform to lobby for
curtailing these rippling waters 124 of injury by the more limiting contract

118. Id. at 775 (“Accordingly, I must apply the cause of action for medical monitoring
recognized in Bower.”).
119. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017
(1982).
120. Rardin v. T & D Machine Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989).
121. See, e.g., Local Joint Exec. Bd., Culinary Workers Union v. Stern, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev.
1982) (applying the “well established common law rule” to bar recovery in negligence for purely
economic loss “absent privity of contract or an injury to person or property”); Trans-Gulf Corp. v.
Performance Aircraft Servs., Inc., 82 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex. App. 2002). Cf. Tiara Condo. Ass’n, Inc.
v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 110 So.3d 399 (Fla. 2013) (limiting economic loss rule’s application to
application only in the products liability context).
122. See, e.g., J’aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) (rejecting common law
economic loss rule in favor of tort duty and foreseeability analysis); Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d
576 (W. Va. 2000); E. Steel Constr., Inc. v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 2001).
123. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
124. Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969):
While it may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited
perforce by the realities of this world. Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the
ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.
See also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 703–04 (quoting the same and exploring the
justifications for the common law bar to recovery of purely economic losses in negligence).
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principles of Hadley 125 foreseeability. Once under a Hadley frame,
plaintiff will not have communicated with defendant the prospect of
consequential damages at the time of contracting because plaintiff did not
enter into a contract with defendant. Accordingly, Judge Posner distills
the Hadley-based analysis down to who is the least cost avoider. Then, to
not much surprise, he finds that plaintiffs in both of the cases were in a
better position at the front to prevent the losses suffered. 126
All the while, Judge Posner skips over any state law precedent, offers
a new standard, and analyzes the facts under the new standard to reach his
preferred conclusion. The lower federal court in the Evra case followed
Illinois state law and entered judgment for the plaintiff for the economic
losses proximately caused by the defendant.127 After examining a choice
of law issue between Illinois and Switzerland, the federal trial judge in a
bench trial determined that Plaintiff satisfied Illinois negligence law for
recovery of its lost profits in the amount of $2.1 million plus attorney
fees. 128 In the appellate proceeding, Judge Posner leaves open the choice
of law question as unnecessary because he views the recovery of
Plaintiff’s lost profits unattainable under Illinois law. But as soon as Judge
Posner begins on the merits of the claim, he cites a non-Illinois case and
a non-contracts case: Hadley. 129 Judge Posner later cites Illinois cases, but
they are contracts cases and he uses them to show Illinois approval of
Hadley. 130 He does not show Illinois rejection of the negligence cases and
doctrines cited by the lower court. On the merits, Judge Posner reverses
Plaintiff’s lost profits recovery. He does not return to a consideration of
state law or any real assessment of the district court judge’s reasoning
under tort law. Instead, Judge Posner confidently concludes that the matter
is clear under the principles he analyzed as framed under Hadley. He does
not mention Erie; presumably he may have assumed his citation of Illinois
contract cases showed all the deference state law required. For Judge
Posner, Plaintiff’s award of lost profits is a clear-cut loser: “We could
remand for new findings based on the proper legal standard, but it is
unnecessary to do so. The undisputed facts, recited in this opinion, show

125. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. 1854).
126. Evra, 673 F.2d at 957; Rardin, 890 F.2d at 28.
127. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (awarding lost profits
caused by defendant’s negligence in failing to wire money in timely fashion), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, rev’d in part, 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
128. Id.
129. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. 1854).
130. Evra, 673 F.2d at 956.
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as a matter of law that Hyman-Michaels is not entitled to recover
consequential damages from Swiss Bank.” 131
In Rardin, Judge Posner doubles down on his Hadley contractual
pathway into negligence claims for pure economic losses. Plaintiff in
Rardin was less fortunate than in Evra: Plaintiff lost in the lower court.
On appeal, Judge Posner once again explores Hadley at length and then
reinforces his reasoning and ruling from Evra. He begins with citation to
federal cases, but eventually reaches Illinois caselaw. Fortunately, this
time he cites to tort cases on point that stand in favor of the common law
economic loss rule, which creates a barrier to recover for purely economic
loss cases. 132 At minimum, he could have saved all the dicta on his
preference for contractual limitations for torts in the commercial context.
Ultimately, Judge Posner stops just short of ignoring state law
doctrine. At the close of Rardin, Judge Posner gives a nod to the substance
of state law regarding the remedial doctrine. 133 He shows a modicum of
restraint in acknowledging that it is the job of the Supreme Court of
Illinois rather than the Seventh Circuit to resolve the regrettable state of
the law: “[T]hat is a task for the Supreme Court of Illinois rather than for
us in this diversity case governed by Illinois law.” 134 But Judge Posner is
resourceful in the end. He finds a way to reach the same result he seeks—
to foreclose Plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery of pure economic loss for
a negligence claim in a commercial setting: “It is enough for us that
Illinois law does not permit a tort suit for profits lost as the result of the
failure to complete a commercial undertaking.” 135 Judge Posner justifies
his “protracted analysis” as “necessary to address the parties’
contentions,” even though the parties did not raise Hadley foreseeability
as the standard to resolve the disputes. He offers that his contractual
reasoning “underscores the desirability—perhaps urgency—of

131. Id. at 959. Cf. Morin Bldg. Prods. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 416–17 (7th Cir.
1983) (Posner, J.) (noting that diversity jurisdiction obligates the court to interpret Indiana’s common
law of contracts and then, after much speculation on the proper contract interpretation of a satisfaction
clause, deferentially declaring: “When in doubt on a difficult issue of state law, it is only prudent to
defer to the view of the district judge, here an experienced Indiana lawyer who thought this the type
of contract where the buyer cannot unreasonably withhold approval of the seller’s performance.”).
132. Judge Posner does not address that the plaintiff in question suffered injury to property.
Plaintiff did not sue to recover that injury because Plaintiff settled with the party with which it held
privity. The contract, however, contained a limit on liability against consequential damages.
Accordingly, Plaintiff sued for pure lost profits from the negligent subcontractor with whom Plaintiff
lacked privity.
133. Rardin, 890 F.2d at 30.
134. Id..
135. Id.
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harmonizing the entire complex and confusing pattern of liability and
nonliability for tortious conduct in contractual settings.” 136
Though Judge Posner ends the opinion with a pivot back to
recognizing the Erie constraint of Illinois law, the damage is done. This
assessment is true even if Judge Posner’s analysis is an improvement to
traditional treatment of pure economic loss cases under tort law. The
reason why it is damaging is not about the merits of the arguments he
makes. Rather, it is whether the federal court has exceeded its authority
by demonstrating a lack of respect for the state supreme court’s authority.
Whatever the federal judge’s intellectual views, the reasoning must begin
with a good-faith exploration of the existing state precedent on the
remedies doctrine in question. Instead, Judge Posner charges directly into
lengthy alternative analysis, and he leaves jurisprudential breadcrumbs for
the next federal court sitting in diversity to consider the topic. By the time
he hits his next opportunity to address a similar case, he is able to cite and
discuss the prior Seventh Circuit case as if it is precedent, even though
state law should have led the inquiry all along. No surprise that the federal
court cites to Rardin and Hadley (including the least cost avoider) rather
than Palsgraf or the common law economic loss bar. 137 Of course, the
underlying states can reject the analysis or admonish Judge Posner for his
attempts to alter treatment of such cases to a contractual rather than
tortious plane, but any opportunity for dialogue must await a relevant case
to reach the state high court.
Federal district courts are playing an increasingly important role in
the development of common law. 138 One cannot expect to learn what the
state of blackletter law is by examining and counting only state high court
decisions. 139 Scholars lament the hollowing out of common law. 140
Meanwhile, law professors increasingly focus on public and specialized
areas rather than core doctrinal areas of private law. As long as judges are
honest about discussing state law precedential constraints and
prerogatives, it is valuable to permit federal judges to develop equity.
State precedents gather dust while more state-based claims arrive in
136. Id.
137. Valenti v. Qualex, Inc., 970 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment against
pure economic loss claim brought for negligence handling of film processing).
138. Richard L. Revesz, The Director’s Letter, Restatements and Diversity Jurisdiction, 40
A.L.I. REP. No. 4 (Fall. 2018), at 1.
139. Id. at 3 (emphasizing that “simply counting how many state supreme courts adopted a
particular rule will not do the trick”).
140. Samuel Issacharoff & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Hollowed Out Common Law (Oct.
10, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3261372 [https://perma.cc/2TXRNLLX].
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federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, removal, and supplemental
jurisdiction. Federal court interpretations of equity will be central to
equity’s success. Ideally, federal judges will exercise this power wisely.
But what if federal judges interpreting equity do so in a manner
potentially inconsistent with state preferences? The Erie doctrine seeks to
ensure uniformity. Yet, significant disformity exists. 141 Uniformity is a
worthy goal, but it is elusive across broad swaths of cases involving
various remedies. Discretion may well cut against pure uniformity and
equity inherently involves more judicial discretion. The import of Erie
may be a reminder that our goal remains: treating like cases alike,
especially as it translates to rights. Yet, Guaranty Trust carves out space
for federal court development of equity and that development may not
align with state doctrines. As discussed below, horizontal uniformity will
exist if federal courts oversee federal equity, but some vertical disformity
may arise.
As long as the federal judge is cognizant of the distinct treatment and
provides principled reasoning for the federal path, disformity may be
tolerable and worth it. Disformity may be palatable if it is just enough to
give care to cases but not so much as to generate hyper-forum shopping.
Is a gray area preferred or a blended approach?
VI. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS THAT FEDERAL COURTS FACE REGARDING
REMEDIES
A.

Elusive Categorization Problems—Disgorgement and Hybrid
Remedies

What if a remedy fails to fit neat categorization? Certain remedies
defy consistent categorization as equitable versus legal. For example,
courts have treated disgorgement inconstantly. Sometimes the
characterization is driven by statute. But other times, the remedy is
attendant to a common-law, state-based claim. Some courts look to
disgorgement’s historical proximity to the equitable remedy of
accounting. 142 Yet, disgorgement of profits may tie more closely to legal

141. See, e.g., Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 87, at 421 (“Our system already tolerates
a substantial amount of legal disuniformity” by state courts and lower federal courts); Sharon K.
Sandeen, The Myth of Federal Uniformity in IP Law, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 277 (2017).
142. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 617 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Restitution for the disgorgement of unjust enrichment is an
equitable remedy with no right to a trial by jury.”); United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052,
1054 (10th Cir. 2006) (disgorgement as equitable remedy for FDCA violation); Castrol, Inc. v.
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restitution when used as a remedy for opportunistic breach of a contract
and may warrant the constitutional right to a jury trial. 143 State law would
govern liability issues and the requisite intent threshold, and the remedy
under such a characterization. But if disgorgement is equitable, then a
federal judge sitting in diversity can determine whether and how much to
award. Is the question of whether a remedy is equitable or legal a matter
of state or federal law? 144
What happens in cases where a federal court issues or approves a
remedy that defies clear classification, or is otherwise novel, due to their
hybrid nature? A couple examples include remedies in fear of cancer cases
and remedies involving comprised chattels of fluctuating value. Like the
Judge Posner examples, these cases often involve intense use of
pontification and signaling, but ultimately apply state law on the right and
the remedy. Though the remedy is sometimes undertheorized.
Fear of cancer cases are fraught with peril, even where liability lies.
The conundrum arises because the more one reconceptualizes the harm,
the more likely that remedies may flow to one class of borderline plaintiffs
while another more serious class may arise later when the money runs
dry. 145 In one perplexing case, a federal district judge reluctantly allowed
a medical monitoring claim to survive without a showing of present
physical injury. 146 The district judge, sitting in diversity jurisdiction,
bristled at having to apply questionable state-law precedent. 147 Still, the
court felt bound by Erie to permit the stretching substantive law, 148 which
in turn opened up the avenue to the novel remedy of medical monitoring.
Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 169 F. Supp.2d 332 (D.N.J. 2001) (disgorgement as equitable under the
Lanham Act); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 784, 785, 789 (D.N.J. 1986).
143. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Disgorgement is a form
of restitution, as Judge Friendly noted . . . and restitution, as we have noted in several non-SEC cases,
is both a legal and an equitable remedy.”); George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied
Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 1, 48 (2007) (maintaining disgorgement may be either equitable or legal). Cf. Robert M. Langer,
John T. Morgan & David Belt, 12 CONN. PRAC., UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES § 6.9 (2018) (exploring
the complexity of categorizing disgorgement). Regarding the right to a jury trial for legal restitution
generally, see First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203 S.W.3d 88 (Ark. 2005).
144. For example, if the claim is a state common law breach of contract, then state law should
determine if request for legal versus equitable for the purposes of right to a jury trial. But, if the jury
trial right exists, federal jury protocol would apply for empaneling the jury.
145. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 170–81 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
146. Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 751, 776 (S.D. W. Va. 2009),
aff’d in part, dismissed in part, 636 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 2011).
147. Id. at 774–75 (detailing contrary precedent but noting what West Virginia law required per
Erie).
148. Id. at 775 (“I am bound to apply West Virginia substantive law in this diversity case. [citing
Erie]. Accordingly, I must apply the cause of action for medical monitoring recognized in Bower.”).
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When exploring the remedy, plaintiffs and federal courts show the
complexity of the hybrid remedy. Toxic tort claims for medical
monitoring abound on the state and federal level. 149 Plaintiffs pursue
varied remedies including legal monetary lump-sum awards, 150 injunctive
orders, 151 or hybrid requests for court involvement in funding or a voucher
system. 152
A federal appellate court confronted a thorny remedies problem
regarding the conversion of stocks. 153 Louisiana law governed the
appropriate “measure of damages” 154 for this tort of conversion. The
appellate court cited Louisiana law to resolve the matter,155 but noted,
pursuant to federal caselaw, that it must show “great deference . . . to a
district judge’s interpretation of the law of his or her state.” 156 The typical
conversion measure is the fair market value at the time and place of
conversion, but this measure may well fall short when the property
fluctuates in value, as this case shows. Ultimately, the federal appellate
artfully interpreted the spirit of the Louisiana “elderly” and analogous
cases to find remedial discretion, which enabled it to approve the district
court’s novel solution: ordering the defendant to “procure and deliver” the
quantity and type of stock wrongfully converted. 157 Maybe the court
viewed it as a proxy for replevin (though the later property is not
plaintiff’s original property)? New York would have solved the
measurement issue by granting the tort victim the highest market value

149. See, e.g., Herbert L. Zarov, Sheila Finnegan, Craig A. Woods & Stephen J. Kane, A
Medical Monitoring Claim for Asymptomatic Plaintiffs: Should Illinois Take the Plunge?, 12 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 7 (2009); in the broader toxic tort context: George W.C. McCarter, Medical
Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation,
45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227 (1993).
150. For an exploration of the variety of remedies employed to achieve medical monitoring, see
Adam P. Joffe, The Medical Monitoring Remedy: Ongoing Controversy and a Proposed Solution, 84
CHI. KENT L. REV. 663, 664 (2009).
151. See D. Scott Aberson, A Fifty-state Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the
Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WILLIAM MITCHELL L.
REV. 1095 (2006).
152. Albeit in a state-court context, Plaintiff requested a unique remedy: “a court-supervised
medical monitoring program funded by defendant;” the state supreme court found the claim not
cognizable. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 714–15 (Mich. 2005). See also Friends for
All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (using a voucher technique).
153. Trahan v. First Nat’l Bank of Ruston, 690 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1982).
154. Id. at 466.
155. Id. at 467 (“In order to reach this conclusion, we must blow a little dust from some cases
decided around the turn of the century.”).
156. Id. at 468, quoting O’Toole v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1982)
(cleaned up).
157. Id. at 466, 468.
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within a reasonable time after discovering the conversion.158 The usual
treatment may stem from the fact that Louisiana maintains a civil law
system. Still, it is disconcerting that the question presented was how to
properly measure legal damages for conversion, but the solution appeared
reminiscent of equity. Would contempt have lied if defendant refused to
deliver? If so, were there questions of federal equity power unconsidered?
As the real facts unfolded, by the time Defendant transferred the stocks
the price had vastly plummeted; the district judge agreed that the remedy
failed and granted plaintiff’s request for recovery of the earlier value, but
the appellate court disagreed. 159 Maybe a restitution theory would best
serve Plaintiff if Defendant wrongfully profited upon the initial
conversion of plaintiff’s security of stock? 160 But, under such an unjust
enrichment claim, the court must again traverse the legal-equitable divide
regarding a disgorgement of unjust gain remedy.
B.

Punitive Damages Attendant to Equitable Rulings

For states that have abolished common-law punitive damages, 161 a
federal court sitting in diversity should not award punitive damages.
Historically, the Court of Chancery did not issue punitive relief because it
lacked the power: punitive damages exceeded equitable jurisdiction. 162
Yet, since the merger of courts of equity with courts of law, “any civil
court has the ‘power’ to impose punitive damages.” 163 Perhaps as an
unintended consequence, some courts considering purely equitable claims
and remedies have imposed punitive damages under a notion of the
court’s obligation “to afford the plaintiff complete relief.” 164 Vindicating
plaintiff’s claim as well as punishing and deterring tortious behavior may
warrant a punitive award theoretically. But the standards for state law
punitive claims are set by the state in question. Constitutional rights to a

158. Ahles v. Aztec Enters., Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (App. Div. 1986); Transcon. Oil Corp.
v. Trenton Prods. Co., 560 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927(1)(b)
(AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 1051.
159. Trahan v. First Nat’l Bank, 720 F.2d 832, 834, reh’g denied, 724 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1983).
160. RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 1051 Comment 4.
161. Id. at 1118 (listing Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Washington as states
that lack common-law punitive damages, and Nebraska as a state that constitutionally prohibits all
punitive damages).
162. Id. at 168.
163. Id. at 399.
164. Id.; see, e.g., I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 189 N.E.2d 812, 812–14 (N.Y. 1963)
(approving the imposition of punitive damages as incidental to injunctive relief).
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jury trial remain unless waived. 165 Federal courts that award punitives
attendant to a state common-law claim of a state that does not authorize
punitive damages 166 dishonor Erie, disrespect state preferences, and
exceed historical federal equity power.
C.

Conflicts and Power Attendant to Contempt Relief

The arena of contempt raises complex possibilities for conflict
between federal and state strictures. For example, certain states such as
California and Texas reject the collateral bar rule in criminal contempt.
Imagine a diversity-jurisdiction defendant breaches a federal injunction,
for example an injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete. In
defendant’s criminal contempt, would the collateral bar rule block the
merits? One federal judge considered whether a state-court injunction
would be sheltered by the collateral bar rule in federal habeas corpus and
decided no. 167
A similar dilemma arises in a state like California that lacks
compensatory contempt. Imagine a diversity-court defendant violates a
federal injunction, would the federal judge follow federal compensatory
contempt or send plaintiff to a second lawsuit for damages? Efficiency
would be better served by permitting federal compensatory contempt. But
would the federal court have the power? It fits within the federal
judiciary’s traditional equity power, but a federal judge would need to
weigh if use of the power impinged too much on our federalism given
California’s contra prerogative.
VII. AN ANALOGY TO THE SUPREME COURT’S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Thorny issues of federalism are not unique to diversity jurisdiction
cases grappling with the Erie doctrine. Valuable insights lie in examining
other contexts in which federal courts face tension on choice-of-law
grounds. A case of original jurisdiction before the United States Supreme
Court sometimes raise tension between federal power and proper respect
for state law doctrines.

165. I.H.P. Corp., 189 N.E. at 812–14 (finding Defendants had waived their constitutional rights
to a jury trial on punitive damages).
166. This statement would not apply to state statutory claims unless the statute fails to authorize
punitive damages or the state is Nebraska where all punitive damages are prohibited.
167. Pedini v. Bowles, 940 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (N.D. Tex. 1996); see also RENDLEMAN &
ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 485.
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For example, in Kansas v. Nebraska, 168 a case of original jurisdiction
rather than diversity, the Supreme Court resolved a provocative remedies
issue arising from one state’s breach of an interstate water compact. 169
Though state disputes about water rights are generally mundane to
observers not invested in the particular stakes, Kansas v. Nebraska is
controversial and groundbreaking. 170 It also provides relevant
considerations toward the delicate federal-state balance Erie seeks to
foster.
The most controversial part of the majority’s opinion is the award of
partial disgorgement in addition to compensation for Nebraska’s breach
of the compact. 171 Kansas alleged, and the Court agreed, that Nebraska
knowingly breached by consciously disregarding Kansas’s water rights
under the compact. 172 Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, endorsed
the Special Master’s ruling of $1.8 million in partial disgorgement of
Nebraska’s ill-gotten gain—over and above an award for Kansas’s $3.7
million compensatory loss caused by Nebraska’s rerouting of water
allocated to Kansas. 173 Disgorgement of profits as a remedy for
wrongdoing is not unprecedented, but as a remedy for a breach of compact
or breach of contract is novel. 174
Justice Thomas wants the application of state contract law175 to
govern rather than the Court’s vast equitable analysis of the Restatement.
He asserts that prior cases followed state law rather than reaching toward
168. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015); see also Caprice L. Roberts, Supreme
Disgorgement, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1413, 1424–26 (2016) (examining the Supreme Court’s disgorgement
award in Kansas v. Nebraska, a breach of water compact case).
169. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1049.
170. Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, supra note 168 (analyzing the Court’s reasoning and
arguing for principled advancement of the law of restitution through the use of its disgorgement
remedy for opportunistic breaches of contract from public to private settings).
171. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1046, 1059 (granting partial disgorgement of $1.8 million in addition
to compensatory damages; Nebraska had conceded breach and compensatory harm in the amount of
$3.7 million for Kansas’s losses).
172. Id. at 1051.
173. Id.
174. Caprice Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach of
Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 991, 1026 (2009); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for
Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131, 134 (2008).
Dissenting opinions in Kansas quoted my work regarding the novelty of the remedy to contract law.
Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Court
for exceeding its equitable powers by following the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment and creating a “‘novel extension’ of the law that finds little if any support in case law”);
id. at 1064–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accord).
175. If state law did govern, the Court would need to resolve choice of law questions regarding
which state’s law should control. Three states were signatories of the original compact. A choice of
law clause would dictate the determination, if present in the compacts.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/11

26

Roberts: Remedies, Equity & <i>Erie</i>

2018]

REMEDIES, EQUITY & ERIE

519

equitable powers to fill gaps in the law. Justice Thomas’s dissent
repeatedly emphasizes the importance of honoring state substantive law,
as a matter of respect for federalism principles and state sovereignty. 176
The purpose of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the
Law, upon its founding, was to clarify doctrinal uncertainties by
pronouncing leading blackletter law. 177 The organization has a broader
mission today: “The American Law Institute is the leading independent
organization in the United States producing scholarly work to clarify,
modernize, and improve the law.” 178 Of course, it continues to enunciate
a clear vision of general common law in the subject area. 179
The Kansas majority opinion answers the critique: “Far from
claiming the power to alter a compact to fit our own views of fairness, we
insist only upon broad remedial authority to enforce the Compact’s terms
and deter future violations.” 180
So, although Kansas v. Nebraska is not a diversity jurisdiction case,
the tension between equity power and state sovereignty over the
development and application of state law doctrines is palpable. There is
much we can learn from the discussion so that in future cases we can strike
the ideal balance of power vis-à-vis federal courts and state law. Ideally,
the Court could exercise its broad remedial equity power while also
showing a modicum of comity toward state law prerogatives regarding
remedy.
This article affirms that federal courts possess power to apply federal
procedure for equity but should exercise that power wisely and with
restraint. Namely, federal courts should use comity toward state variances
especially where outcome determinative. If the federal court wishes to
exercise equity power, plaintiff must still establish violation of the
underlying right.

176. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1066–67 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Authority over water is a core attribute of state sovereignty, and ‘[f]ederal courts should pause
before using their inherent equitable powers to intrude into the proper sphere of the States.’”) (quoting
his own concurrence in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995)).
177. A.L.I., About ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ [https://perma.cc/CX5N-XREG ] (last
visited Feb. 1, 2019) (“The Committee recommended that the first undertaking should address
uncertainty in the law through a restatement of basic legal subjects that would tell judges and lawyers
what the law was. The formulation of such a restatement thus became ALI’s first endeavor.”). But cf.
Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the
American Law Institute for departing from descriptions of the status of blackletter law in favor of
opting “instead to set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to be”).
178. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 177.
179. Id.
180. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1053 n.4.
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VIII. BENEFITS OF FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES
AND DEFENSES
A.

System of Equity 181

Equity is discrete and valuable, historically and conceptionally. 182
Important principles of equity exist within federal precedents. Equity
power has a rich history in the federal judiciary; a history worth
remembering and revisiting. Federal judges should continue to resolve
vexing questions regarding how to craft equitable remedies and when to
apply equitable defenses. This article maintains they should do so whether
the claim is based on federal or state law. Federal equitable doctrines,
remedies, and defenses are worth saving. Federal judges should exercise
restraint as they oversee federal equity’s development and refinement.
B.

Promotion of Uniformity

To the extent that uniformity remains an important goal under Erie
and beyond, maintaining federal court as an arbiter of proper equitable
doctrine and scope will help serve uniformity. Of course, complete
uniformity will remain elusive. For example, a state court hearing an
identical state-based claim may deny an equitable remedy that a federal
court sitting in diversity might have granted, and vice versa. Although
perfect uniformity is not attainable, development of federal equity will
promote horizontal equity across the federal system whether the claim is
based on federal or state law. For state-based claims, the substance still
depends on the state law’s requirements. 183 The contours of the
application of equitable remedies and defenses, however, would rest with
181. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, supra note 59.
182. Id.
183. If a state statute dictates or prohibits an equitable remedy for a state statutory claim, it raises
a more striking conflict for a federal court to disregard state explicit prerogatives. Again, the federal
court would need to keep apprised of the letter of state law and ensure that the substantive claim is
proven before any federal equitable remedy could lie. By comparison, a federal court maintains
equitable discretion to grant or deny relief unless a federal statute clearly and explicitly forecloses
that discretion. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (ruling that the federal
judiciary maintained the authority to deny injunctive relief despite violation of a federal statute by the
U.S. government’s failure to obtain a permit for military test-bombing near Viéques Island off the
coast of Puerto Rico). Importantly, in the federal system, Congress has the power to curtail federal
court jurisdiction including narrowing available remedies. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. State
legislatures have the power to curtail state court jurisdiction, but do not possess such direct authority
over federal court power. What happens if a state deems its law substantive rather than procedural?
See Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan R. Jones, Adrift on Erie: Characterizing Forum Selection Clauses,
52 AKRON L. REV. 295 (2019) (maintaining every sovereign has the power to determine whether its
laws are substantive or procedural).
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the discretion of the federal judge bounded by federal equity doctrines and
precedent. Federal judges will help shape and refine federal equity
principles through enunciated reasoning. 184 That reasoning will sharpen
from within federal courts and may influence state court determinations if
a state court seeks guidance.
C.

Accountability

Accountability is key. Federal judges have life tenure, but
accountability in decision making remains through reputation, public
opinion, and the appellate process. Judges are also bound by institutional
constraints. 185 The more federal judges show their reasoning regarding
equitable principles the better. Brooding, mystical equity has no place in
modern law. Well-defined equitable doctrines and boundaries are in high
demand. Litigants and their counsel will help guide federal court
development. The appellate process will foster further refinement.
Scholarly attention to this field will aid maintenance of a healthy system
of federal equity.
D.

Bounded Discretion

Discretion is at the heart of equity power. It is also the Achilles’ heel.
Discretion, if abused, will cause equity’s demise. Judges must use
restraint in the exercise of discretion to help maintain this important
power. Restraint includes enunciating equity’s principles more explicitly
and following them unless there are valid reasons to refine the doctrine. It
also includes recognizing the historical roots of equity jurisdiction
authorizing federal courts to act in person on defendants in extraordinary
ways. With each application of equity, the court must examine the breadth
and depth of the scope of the remedy or defense. The broader the stroke,
the more vulnerable to scrutiny the federal judiciary will be. Such power
may be appropriate, but receptivity will depend on proof of the violated
right as well as the federal equity precedent for the application.

184. This is an argument in favor of increasing judicial articulation of “reasoned elaboration.”
HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 143–52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(theorizing that judges must demonstrate “reasoned elaboration” in opinion writing); see also Roberts,
Supreme Disgorgement, supra note 168, at 1437, 1440.
185. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 254–58 (1978) (suggesting
a certain kind of bounding through a coherent jurisprudence in that judges should decide cases with
an eye toward crafting a coherent body of precedent); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1325, 1343–44 (1984) (exploring a judge’s duty to maintain continuity).
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Of course, equity power historically has included flexibility. 186 This
feature at its best is adaptability to new forms of wrongdoing that might
go unremedied and undeterred if the court were to be overly strict about
specific methods of wrongdoing. 187 At its worst, however, equity becomes
a shapeshifter that appears manipulable well beyond the scope of the right.
To exercise equity power wisely, federal courts must show awareness of
these concerns as well as other potential risks of equity. Ultimately,
federal judges must balance the benefits accordingly.
IX. COSTS OF FEDERAL EQUITY
Federal development of equitable doctrines should continue. Still,
there are dangers inherent in this conclusion. Serious dangers include
judicial overreaching and federal encroachments on state sovereignty.
Additional concerns include risks of judicial rigidity of doctrine, which
dovetails with the risk of exacerbating imperfect and fundamentally
flawed rulings. Overall, with certain safeguards, the development of
federal equity is worth the risks.
A.

Judicial Overreaching

In developing remedies jurisprudence, federal judges may overreach.
Important criticisms of nationwide injunctions exist. 188 Federal judges are
at the heart of these controversies as the ones who sometimes are issuing
injunctions benefitting nonparties. Note, however, that the national
injunction cases arise under federal law, 189 so development of federal

186. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1944) (describing how flexibility
rather than rigidity has been the hallmark of equity).
187. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 471 Definition of
Constructive Trusts (rev. ed. 1978) (“The court does not restrict itself by describing all the specific
forms of inequitable holding which will move it to grant relief but rather reserves freedom to apply
this remedy to whatever knavery human ingenuity can invent.”); see also DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra
note 90, § 4.1(2); RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 569–70.
188. See, e.g., Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 59; Amanda Frost, In Defense of
Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class
Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2017); Michael T.
Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97
B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017); Wasserman, supra note 86.
189. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 at *2–*3 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting an injunction blocking the United States from any enforcement of
President Trump’s travel ban), stay denied, No. 17–35101, 2017 WL 526497 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017)
(per curiam); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming a similarly broad injunction),
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (Mem.), remanded to 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017). President Trump altered
the underlying executive proclamation, mooting cases pending before the Supreme Court. More broad
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equity has costs beyond the federal-state balance that Erie struck. To the
extent federal equity is engaging in tightening of equity through additional
rigors, this danger is slight.
B.

Federalism and State Sovereignty

Federal judges handling cases that include state law claims must
remain aware of state law prerogatives. A remedy may not issue without
the establishment of a proven right. For cases in diversity, this means that
plaintiff must meet state law thresholds for the right, though standards for
any equitable remedy derive primarily from the federal court’s precedent.
This balance may be tricky with equitable remedies such as
preliminary injunctions that precede full trials on the merits. For example,
in such moments, federal procedure would govern the quantum of proof
for the likelihood of success on the merits, and federal equity principles
would govern whether access to the remedy ultimately should lie under
the court’s equity power. The assessment of the merits themselves,
however, would still be on the underlying state law creating the
substantive claim.
This may result in a plaintiff or defendant forum shopping. Parties
forum shop for all sorts of reasons. Empirical works beyond the scope of
this article may shed light on the level and motivations behind such
choices. On whole, however, it is more likely that litigants prefer certain
districts (or particular judges) within the federal system than litigants
viewing the entire federal system as more or less lenient on remedies than
the whole state system. Still, assuming that some litigants may seek a
federal forum purely to get a more favorable reception for an equitable
remedy (or defense), why shouldn’t the issuing federal court—subject to
appellate review within the federal system—control whether it will lend
its equitable hand to securing the right at stake?
No doubt, allowing federal courts to continue to plow the fields of
equity comes with risks. It is critical to be mindful of the risks and vigilant
with critiques. For better or worse, federal opinions garner more visibility.
This phenomenon will help ensure accountability and, ideally, course
correction.

injunctions followed in this area and other arenas. The ultimate fate of this type of injunction is
unknown.
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Risk of Rigidity

In certain areas, the Supreme Court, in particular, has developed
what may be overly rigid doctrines of equity. The Court may well be
responding to perceived criticisms regarding the unmoored nature of
equity. For example, if one views equity as subjective fairness, then there
is a risk of favoritism and bias. A rational response is to show that equity
follows the law. 190 This notion means both that equity can go nowhere
without respecting the underlying right, but it also connotes that equity
follows principles, doctrines, and precedent.
Accordingly, it makes sense that one who cares about restoration of
respect for equity and equitable remedies might reinstate an overt
formalism. 191 This path appears to be Justice Thomas’s approach to
remedies and equity. It is commendable, although it may be imperfect and
overly rigid in certain arenas. Dictating strict adherence to four-factor
tests for preliminary or permanent injunctions may strangle lower federal
court good-faith developments.
For example, the Supreme Court’s accidental revolution with eBay
struck a wise blow to unelucidated, categorial federal equity rulings. But
it may have swung the pendulum too far the other direction by stifling the
ability to have variation in accomplishing the same goals. In other words,
lower federal courts may honor equity’s overarching requirements for
exercise of equity power, but they may execute equity in a variety of ways.
This experimentation may remain necessary, especially across different
substantive areas—pursuant to both state and federal law claims. For
instance, there were historic reasons why injunctions sought in certain
substantive areas were disfavored and garnered heightened burdens. 192
There may also be valid reasons for sliding scales. 193
190.

JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ADAPTED FOR ALL THE STATES, AND TO THE UNION OF LEGAL AND

EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE REFORMED PROCEDURE, Vol. I, § 363 (John Norton Pomeroy, Jr.,
ed., 4th ed. 1918) (detailing equity’s maxims); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at
425 (exploring the same).
191. See Ernest A. Young, Erie as a Way of Life, 52 AKRON L. REV. 193 (2019). (Professor
Young eloquently defended Erie’s command and suggested a renewed interest in legal formalism.)
192. See, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 975
(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The Supreme Court affirmed the decision without elucidation on the
preliminary injunction standard. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006).
193. See, e.g., Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598
F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying a sliding-scale test); cf. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 75 (2d
Cir. 2010) (explaining the historical and policy rationale for presumptions and sliding scales in the
Second Circuit, but declaring that the injunction standard of eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S.
388, 390 (2006), extends to preliminary injunctions in the copyright context).
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It remains unclear as to whether this type of alternative reasoning
may persist post eBay and Winter. Justice Ginsburg maintains that the
Supreme Court has not outlawed the use of such variations. 194 Her
remarks came in dissent, though powerful on the need for flexibility in
interpreting equity’s standards to remain. 195 In a section aptly titled,
“Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction[,]” Justice Ginsburg
explained that “[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of
the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of
the particular case.” 196 Accordingly, the distinguishing characteristic is
“[f]lexibility rather than rigidity.” 197 In Justice Ginsburg’s assessment,
equity permits balancing considerations in varied ways:
Consistent with equity’s character, courts do not insist that litigants
uniformly show a particular, predetermined quantum of probable
success or injury before awarding equitable relief. Instead, courts have
evaluated claims for equitable relief on a “sliding scale,” sometimes
awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood
of success is very high. 198

Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning is compelling, but it has not garnered
explicit adoption by the majority of the Court. Thus, the continued validity
of variations remains unclear. The Court’s explicit repetition of rote
factors as the sole historical factors to be analyzed systematically causes
a perception of extreme rigidity. Such rigidity may also stifle state court
considerations. 199 The Supreme Court would be wise to reflect on overly
rigid equity pronouncement so as not to foreclose avenues that foster
valuable balancing between protection of rights and abuses of equity
power.

194. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This
Court has never rejected that formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.”).
195. Id.
196. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312); Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329
197. Id. (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312); Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329.
198. Id. (emphasis added) (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 11A FED. PRAC. & PROC.: FED.
RULES OF CIV. PROC. § 2948.3 (West 2018)).
199. With respect to state court forums, note that there is a way to interpret federal law to allow
states to apply their own procedure when an injunction sought in state court touches on federal law.
Also, states remain free to apply their own procedures to requests for equitable remedies under statebased causes of action. See, e.g., InnoSys, Inc. v. Mercer, 364 P.3d 1013, 1020 (Utah 2015). Cf.
Morley, supra note 3, at 220 (maintaining state courts should have the authority to form its own
equitable doctrines that apply “equally” in both state and federal court).
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Risk of Imperfection

Just because federal courts have the power to develop equity
jurisprudence for remedies, does not mean they will always get it right.
For example, assume the Supreme Court develops federal principles for
equitable remedies in flawed ways. The Court has imperfectly and rigidly
declared the uniformity of the equitable test for preliminary and
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permanent injunctions. 200 It has slipped in other arenas as well including
contempt, 201 disgorgement, 202 restitution, 203 and more. 204

200. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v.
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 73, 76–77, 80 (2008); Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry
E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 203, 206–19 (2012) (examining multiple lower courts across the circuits that viewed
eBay as altering traditional approaches). Federal courts are split on the extent to which they retain
discretion to vary injunction standards. Compare Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010)
(under federal question jurisdiction under the Copyright Act, the Second Circuit determines that it
will follow eBay and Winter rather than its circuit precedent with long history of granting such
preliminary injunctions to protect against copyright infringement), with Citigroup Glob. Mkts, 598
F.3d at 34 (in which the Second Circuit maintained a sliding scale methodology for injunction
determinations).
201. The Supreme Court grappled with a tough issue over whether massive monetary contempt
fines ($52 million) amounted to criminal rather than civil coercive contempt. Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994). The Court ruled the serious fines were criminal and thus
required higher procedural standards. Id. at 824–38. This determination is defensible, and one would
want to err on that side in the case of a close call. That said, a strange procedural wrinkle may
demonstrate incomplete logic. The parties to the litigation had settled; the strike had ended and thus
the behavior ceased. Id. at 825. The only contempt amount in question, the $52 million, was an amount
the circuit judge had ordered defendant to pay a non-party (certain counties and the Commonwealth
of Virginia). The circuit judge had appointed a Special Commissioner, Bagwell, to collect the unpaid
contempt amount. The Virginia intermediate appellate court accepted the parties’ settlement and
would have dismissed the whole matter, but the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the contempt award
in favor of Bagwell. This posture demonstrates why the Virginia Supreme Court should have vacated
the fines upon the parties’ requests, if indeed the contempt was civil, and why that court’s insistence
on keeping the fines to protect the court show the public purpose and therefore additional reasoning
for determination that the fine was criminal. Id. at 847–48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Further, to what
extent, should the case have continued up the chain to the Supreme Court if the only interest involved
a nonparty? There are other worthy questions regarding federal court power to issue equitable relief
that inures to the benefit of nonparties. Courts have also done similar maneuvers when routing part
of punitive recoveries to state entities, though this result is usually by virtue of state statutes (Oregon
for example).
202. Roberts, supra note 168, at 1431–35 & 1437–38 (criticizing the arbitrary and
overcompensatory aspects of the Court’s endorsement of the Special Master’s determination of the
amount of disgorgement and permitting its recovery along with compensatory damages). In the
intellectual property area, the Supreme Court continues to spark controversy regarding the use, scope,
and classification of disgorgement as legal versus equitable. See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (interpreting statutory authorization to disgorge a design-patent infringer’s
“total profit.”); see also Mark Gergen & Pamela Samuelson, The Disgorgement Remedy of Design
Patent Law, 108 CALIF. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020) (articulating limits of causation and
apportionment to define proper scope of the total-profits disgorgement remedy for fragmented designs
in design patent law), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353536.
203. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003); see also RENDLEMAN
& ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 406–08.
204. For example, a possible regrettable course might be the hard shift away from a functional
test of the legal or equitable nature of remedies sought, see, e.g., Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry,
494 U.S. 558, 572–80 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring), to a much more historical emphasis in the
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A stark example is Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond
Fund, Inc. 205 Justice Scalia held that a federal court lacked power to issue
an asset freeze injunction 206 because the court did not possess proper
equity jurisdiction for this particular remedy historically. 207 He reasoned
that historic authority was lacking: “[T]he equitable powers conferred by
the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include the power to create remedies
previously unknown to equity jurisprudence.” 208 This rigid view is overly
constrained, as Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion maintained. 209
Justice Ginsburg asserted that federal equity jurisdiction is instead flexible
and develops over time. 210 Absent a legislative prohibition, Justice
Ginsburg argued that federal courts possessed the power to issue asset
freeze injunctions. 211 The Erie issue had not arisen in the lower federal
court, and the Court declined to consider it on appeal.
Imperfections in classifications and reasoning may well continue. On
balance, however, it is worth maintaining a federal system of equitable
principles despite the risks. Ideally, a system that develops in a flexible
yet principled fashion.
X. CONCLUSION
Federal equity power in fashioning remedies is worth maintaining.
Erie generally dictates that federal courts sitting in diversity follow state
substantive law. The Supreme Court also carved inartful inroads regarding
equity. Such inroads established a pathway for federal courts to execute
equity pursuant to traditional principles, even when resolving state
substantive claims. The passage of time, the merger of law and equity, and
fear of abuses endanger equity’s future. But equitable remedies and
defenses, issued by federal courts sitting in diversity, remain vital to the
protection of state-based rights pursued in federal court. Federal equity
power cannot be boundless. Rather, federal courts must continue to

examination of the federal constitutional right to a jury trial, as implemented in Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340 (1998) (Thomas, J.).
205. Grupo Mexicano de DeSarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (54).
206. A preliminary injunction ordering a party not to dispose of assets pending adjudication.
207. Id. at 318–29. “We must ask, therefore, whether the relief respondents requested here was
traditionally accorded by courts of equity.” Id. at 319.
208. Id. at 332. State courts, however, are not bound to follow the Court’s view of federal court
power. Scratch Golf Co. v. Dunes W. Residential Golf Prop., Inc., 603 S.E.2d 905 (S.C. 2004);
Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 623 S.E.2d 833 (S.C. 2005).
209. Grupo, 527 U.S. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 342 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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develop and apply equity principles, but they must do so in a manner that
demonstrates principled discretion in crafting remedies doctrines that
balance the litigants, underlying rights, and state prerogatives. Federal
judges must enunciate, clear reasoning to restore the best of equity’s
traditions of justice with an eye toward satisfying doctrinal requirements.
If all that results is no more predictable than one Chancellor’s foot, then
federal courts will not have succeeded in this vital task. Instead, may
equity continue to flourish with the wise exercise of federal judicial power
and restraint.
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